CA Sunil Kumar, FCAFCA · Governance Frameworks & Books

Funders Get the Governance They Pay For

Part of the Institutional Governance & Resilience section of the Knowledge Hub.

By CA Sunil Kumar, FCA · 7 November 2026 · 5 min read

Funders Get the Governance They Pay For: why good governance in the social sector has to be funded.

First published in my LinkedIn newsletter on 7 November 2026.

Funders ask their NGO partners for strong governance: independent boards, sound controls, working complaints systems, reserves and succession plans. Yet many of the same funders allow almost nothing for the cost of building them. This article argues that many governance failures in the social sector are predictable results of how it is funded, and proposes three practical shifts for funders who want well-governed partners.

Picture a mid-sized NGO preparing a proposal for a new CSR partner. The due-diligence questionnaire runs to many pages. Does the Board have independent members? Is there an internal audit? Is there a whistleblower policy, and how many complaints were received last year? Does the organisation hold reserves? Is there a succession plan for the chief executive?

The NGO answers every question as best it can. Then it turns to the budget template. Administrative costs are capped at a small percentage. Salaries of the finance team are allowed only in proportion to the time spent on this project. There is no line for board development, internal audit, systems or training. The money is for programmes.

The organisation is being asked to show governance it is not being paid to build.

This scene is a composite, but most finance heads in the sector will recognise it. Different funders, different forms, the same pattern.

The governance paradox

Governance is not free. A competent finance team costs money. So do an internal audit, an accounting system that can track restricted funds properly, a complaints mechanism that someone actually runs, board meetings that are prepared for, and the time of senior staff who must attend to all of this rather than to programmes.

When grants are almost entirely restricted to programme costs, these expenses must come from unrestricted income. Most NGOs have very little of it. The result is predictable. The finance function is one or two people doing the work of five. Approvals route through the founder because there is no second line to delegate to. Complaints are handled informally because there is no one to investigate them properly. There are no reserves, so every delayed release becomes a crisis.

The policies exist on paper, because the questionnaire asked for them. The controls behind the policies often do not.

Internationally, this has been described as the non-profit “starvation cycle”: funders expect low overheads, organisations under-report their real costs to meet those expectations, and the expectations fall further. The same cycle applies to governance. Funders expect strong governance on thin budgets, organisations report that they have it, and the gap between the form and the reality grows quietly.

What happens when it fails

Sooner or later, something goes wrong. A complaint escalates. A donor audit finds irregularities that weak controls failed to catch. A key person leaves and records cannot be reconstructed. The funder’s response is usually to suspend or terminate the grant.

That response is understandable. But it often punishes the community the programme was meant to serve, and it rarely asks the harder question: did our own funding practices make this failure more likely?

A funder that would never invest in a company without asking whether its management team was adequately resourced often funds an NGO without asking the same question.

Three shifts for funders

First, fund governance explicitly. Treat the cost of governance as part of the cost of delivering the programme, not as overhead to be minimised. This can be done in two ways. One is to include a defined share in every grant for finance, controls, board development and complaints systems, agreed openly with the partner. The other is a separate capacity grant, sometimes over two or three years, to help a partner strengthen its systems. Either way, the conversation changes from “how low can your overheads be?” to “what does it take for you to be well governed?”

Second, share standards instead of multiplying questionnaires. A mid-sized NGO may fill in several due-diligence forms in a year, each asking similar questions in different formats. The time spent on these forms is time not spent on governance itself. Funders could agree on a common governance framework, accept assessments done by peer funders, or support a shared platform where an NGO’s governance information is verified once and used many times. This lowers costs for everyone and raises the quality of the information.

Third, judge how problems are handled, not whether they arise. No organisation that works with people in difficult conditions will be free of problems. A well-governed NGO is not one that never has a complaint or an audit finding. It is one that records, investigates and fixes them, and tells its funders honestly. If disclosure is met with termination, partners learn to hide problems. If it is met with support, they learn to surface them early, when they are still small. Funders who want honesty must make it safe.

Governance as part of impact

None of this means lowering standards. It means paying for them.

Good governance is not a distraction from impact. It is what makes impact last. It protects beneficiaries from harm, protects funds from misuse, and protects programmes from collapsing when a key person leaves or a donor withdraws. Funders who pay for it get partners they can trust over the long run. Funders who do not are often surprised by failures they helped to create.

The question every funder can ask before its next grant is simple: are we paying for the governance we are asking for?

Disclosure: An AI tool (Claude) was used to prepare the first draft of this article from the author’s framework and his detailed comments. The author reviewed and revised the text, and the views are his own.

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About the author: CA Sunil Kumar, FCA is a Chartered Accountant with 30+ years in NGO and development-sector finance, audit and governance, and the creator of the governance maturity toolkits. This article is general information, not professional advice.